Friday, April 15, 2011

China's Tepid Economic Tightening


March data shows the Chinese economy growing rapidly, along with inflation. Lending for the month is up, and the share of alternative forms of financing has continued to grow after a swift rise in 2010. The data shows that whatever success authorities have had in tightening credit, banks and companies keep finding ways to circumvent controls. Contrary to official pronouncements, the recent data indicates there is little appetite for aggressively tackling inflation expectations in China.

Analysis

New economic statistics from China for the month of March show that the government’s tightening policy remains half-hearted. The economy grew at a 9.7 percent clip in the first quarter, though that number is down from 10.3 percent annual rate in 2010. Meanwhile, inflation hit 5.4 percent, the highest since July 2008. High inflation was expected, and the decision by the People’s Bank earlier this month to raise interest rates for a fourth time signaled its awareness of the rising pressures.

But interest rates do not determine credit conditions in China. Most important is the influx of credit, which shows no sign of significant slowing. True, new loans issued in the first quarter totaled 2.2 trillion yuan ($336 billion), down by about 14 percent from the same period last year, revealing a greater degree of control. But March lending rose to 679.4 billion yuan ($104 billion), considerably higher than 506.7 billion yuan in March 2010. This does not support claims by central authorities of more determined tightening.

Crucially, the share of alternative forms of financing (published now for the first time as part of “total social financing” or “national financing”) has continued to grow, after a rapid rise in 2010. This shows that despite any success authorities have had in tightening credit, banks and companies are finding ways to circumvent controls. Bank loans now make up only about half of total financing, and the government has much more difficulty controlling the off-balance sheet and underground lending. The national financing total was 4.19 trillion yuan ($641 billion), showing the massive proportions of the ongoing credit binge. If maintained at the same pace throughout 2011, the total would surpass 16 trillion yuan ($2.5 trillion), greater than the 14.27 trillion ($2.18 trillion) tallied in 2010 (though credit issued in the first quarter tends to be on the high side).

(Click here to enlarge image)

The March data shows that, contrary to official pronouncements, there remains little appetite for aggressively tackling inflation expectations. The central government is ineffective in constraining prices and the monetary and credit forces that contribute to price growth, in part because of resistance from banks and corporations. The government is also wary of excessive tightening amid growing risks to growth. These include high commodity prices, the Japanese slowdown and global unrest.

The central government is still bickering with local governments that refuse to lower their real estate price-growth targets and has so far only threatened vague punishments for those that do not comply. Residential prices rose 6.6 percent on the official measure, while investment in real estate rose 34 percent in March year-on-year. This shows that attempts to curb these rises are meeting with little success, and has fueled fears of highly risky asset bubbles.

The National Development and Reform Commission continues to deny companies the right to raise prices, excepting necessary hikes on fuel and power that it seeks to delay and minimize. Direct price controls on food and consumer goods remain in place and will likely tighten. On April 14, 24 industrial associations announced, under pressure from Beijing, that they would not attempt to raise prices on key consumer goods. Exceptions will occur: the commission approved an electricity price increase in Shanxi and 10 other provinces because power companies were operating at a loss amid high coal prices. Corporations, especially energy companies and utilities, are demanding subsidies to offset the losses caused by purchasing inputs at international prices, then selling at domestically capped levels. This bickering will worsen as Beijing strives to shield the public from higher prices while companies resort to alternative or illegal ways to benefit themselves.

With growth surging, inflation remains the chief risk. The government will continue its marginal attempts to tighten policy in order to avoid losing control of the situation, while relying on price controls to alleviate the hardest hit areas. Economic conditions are pushing social dissatisfaction to new levels. Food inflation remained stubbornly high, at 11.7 percent, despite the government’s heavy hand in controlling grain and vegetable prices since late 2010. That 11.7 percent takes into account the statistical bureau’s attempt to downplay food prices by reducing their weight in the Consumer Price Index by 2.21 percent earlier this year. In any case, most Chinese people feel official statistics significantly understate the rise in food prices.

Still, there are sporadic indications of the government’s anti-inflationary measures achieving a degree of success. Inflation did fall slightly from the previous month. These measures pose a risk to growth. Smaller companies can have trouble obtaining enough financing to meet rising costs or, lacking political influence, cannot offset their losses with subsidies. Given the potential for social unrest, the government could be forced to take more drastic anti-inflationary measures. However, with extensive fears about growth and collapsing asset bubbles, Beijing seems prepared to maintain the high-growth status quo and use harsh security measures to suppress any unrest.


www.stratfor.com

Thursday, April 14, 2011

The Arrest of China's Ai Weiwei

Chinese artist Ai Weiwei was detained April 3 at the Beijing airport. He is among numerous lawyers and activists who have been detained since the Jasmine rallies began early February. The most important issue surrounding Ai’s detainment is not about the artist himself, who has received mixed responses within China, but the timing.

The timing of the arrest of Ai Weiwei, who has pushed a very mutable, non-transparent redline on numerous occasions, is very curious. It illustrates a change in government behavior and tolerance, not merely reflected by anything Ai said or did. Moreover, Ai’s crimes have not been formally announced; there’s been talk of him being charged on economic crimes, but there’s also been talk of subversion based on his art and political activities that openly disparage the Communist Party of China (CPC). In particular, a picture of him with a grass-mud horse, which, said in Chinese in different tones, is a harsh expletive aimed at the CPC.

Ironically, Ai’s arrest attracts more, not less, attention to the social uprisings the Chinese government has been aggressively trying to contain. Ultimately, when domestic security is threatened, the government’s priority is not on managing public perception — and especially not on managing international perception.

But why are they doing this now, when figures like Ai have pushed the boundaries on numerous occasions? There are three factors that have contributed to the growing sensitivities. The first is the fear generated by the uprisings in the Middle East. The second is rising social concerns, primarily centered on inflation. The third is the upcoming 2012 transition in China. Chinese President Hu Jintao does not want large-scale protests to develop and mar his legacy. The biggest question is how long they will be able to maintain this level of social control.

Finally, these arrests — Ai’s in particular — underline China’s growing scrutiny. Beijing believes these protests are foreign-generated, and there are many indications of these protests being originated outside of China, where many of Ai’s supporters are located. The lack of legal protocol or transparency highlighted in these arrests underlines the difficulty of operating in China.


www.stratfor.com

Thursday, April 7, 2011

Why the Shi Lang (Varyag) will never see action



Chinese media is alight with the coming unveiling of China’s first aircraft carrier, Shi Lang (Varyag) and although it may send shivers of discontent through its regional adversaries one has to state, there’s no reason why China shouldn’t have a carrier.


After all, the US, UK, France, Russia, Japan, India, Brazil, Argentina, Canada, Italy, Spain, Australia, Netherlands and Thailand all have had one or more at sometime in history, so why not China now? The simple answer is that there’s no reason why China shouldn’t have one, it has maritime interests and is a burgeoning power and deserves to have an offshore navy.


However, like most things in the Chinese military these days it is set to burst onto the scene with enormous fanfare and hyperbole which unfortunately places it in the realms of ‘unreality’ before it even starts. It is a mistake by the CCP leadership to place the nation’s hopes on a converted, old, Soviet, rust-bucket. However this mistake is already in full swing, with Xinhua describing the ship as embodying “70 years of Chinese hopes".

The ship will be under incredible pressure to speed through the learning curve on how to run a modern day carrier. Add on to this the expectations of 1.2billion people and it is enough to sink any ship. I can’t begin to imagine the pressure the captain and his pilots will be under and that’s just in peacetime.

So, if war should break out, what might we expect from the Shi Lang (Varyag)?

Unfortunately in the annals of maritime history, fate is rarely kind to new-pretenders and their capital ships. One only needs to look at the fates of the Bismark, hunted down and destroyed by the nimbler, more experienced Royal Navy. Or the Yamato class super battleships, picked off by the US airforce, to grasp that capital ships often serve as good target practices and nothing else.


In reality though, I think the Shi Lang’s fate maybe far less heroic and share a fate similar to Veinticinco de Mayo.

For those of you who don’t know, the Veinticinco de Mayo was the Argentinean aircraft carrier that played no role in the Falklands War in 1982. After hearing that the British Task Force was sailing, the De Mayo was put to sea to intercept, but bad weather prevented any attack and it returned to port. Once in port it never left again for the duration of the war.

Why did it stay in port?

Because it knew for sure that it would be sunk by British subs. The British had thrown a 200mile exclusion zone around the Falkland Islands and another Argentinean capital ship, the General Belgrano had been sunk steaming away from the islands, killing 1,500 sailors and sending a clear message to the De Mayo that as soon as it entered deep water it would be hit. British subs had express orders to sink the De Mayo on sight, regardless of its destination.

So that was the end of the De Mayo, it sat out the war, useless, while the British brought in their two carriers Invincible and Hermes and quickly gained air superiority with their superior Sea Harrier jumpjets. 10,000miles from home, the Royal Navy was able to bring superior force to bear on the Argentineans who were just 400 miles away from the battle.

This is nothing to do with luck. It’s about experience, timing and utilization of kit, because having a carrier battle group requires a whole suite of ships to protect it. They’re not a beginners piece of kit. In a small navy, the amount of ships needed to protect a carrier puts huge pressures on the enitre navy. For the carrier to move into hostile territoy takes incredible amounts of coordination.

Unfortunately for the Shi Lang (Varyag) , it will ply its trade in seas infested with the subs of the world’s two most formidable fleets, the US and the Japanese. The Japanese navy cut its teeth on 60 years of Cold War, tracking the best of the Soviet fleet in the seas off Japan, China’s backyard, and the US navy needs no introduction. So, with just an infant anti-submarine fleet the Chinese Southern navy will be easily found wanting, leaving the Shi Lang with little protection, making it highly unlikely that it will ever be able to be brought to the fight.

One may add that the Chinese navy has the largest submarine fleet in the region, with over 60 boats. Surely these will be the counter weight to protect the Shi Lang? But this fleet too, is untested, with only a few boats being truly world class, and don’t forget, in WW2, the German Wolf-packs had more than 300 U-boats, yet they still weren’t able to win the Battle for the Atlantic.

On top of this, the Age of the Carrier is over. We are in the twighlight of the Carrier Strike Group’s power. America knows this and is slowly but surely moving away from them. Long-Range-Unmanned Strike is the future of warfare. Just like the Yamato Class Battleships of WW2 came at the end of the Age of the Battleship, so Shi Lang (Varyag) joins the party too late to make a difference.

I know that I may seem like a party-pooper, but I wager that the Shi Lang (Varyag) wont venture out of port if a serious conflict breaks out within the next 10 years, as the CCP wont want to risk losing it. That’s the price you have to pay when you place the hopes of an entire nation on one ship. China certainly deserves to have a carrier, but it is a mistake to pin the national interest upon a ship that is outdated before the first plane has even taken off.