Wednesday, June 29, 2011

China’s folly into naval warfare – three compounding reasons why the PLA Navy will flounder


Just a cursory look at Chinese naval history reveals that it is by no means its strongest hand. The Qing Fleet, described by the press at the time as the finest navy in the region was easily routed and then scuttled by the Japanese. Kubliai’s two attempts at mustering the Chinese nation to invade Japan were devastated by divine winds and Zheng He, who was at best a littoral explorer of far away places that had already been discovered by the existing residents long before he arrived.

Zheng He may arguably be China’s greatest mariner but whatever he had going, by way of naval prowess, was soon shutdown by the characteristically xenophobic and thoroughly land-based thinking of the ruling Chinese elites. In its claimed 5000 years of history China has consistently under-performed when it comes to floating a credible navy. This is not to say that this is a problem, China as a vast country with a huge population has consistently and rightfully concentrated upon its heartland and not the sea. Even past Chinese Emperors have proudly boasted that no island has ever become part of the Chinese core.

Oddly then, as China steps into the limelight as a global player in the 21st century it seems to be more and more determined to gamble its fortunes on the sea, something it has a patchy historical record in.

Yes, I know the reasoning. China can’t leave its “security” to others, namely the US navy, so it is forced to expand into this theatre to protect its interests whether it wants to or not. But from an outsider looking in, it seems that China is on a fast track to yet another naval folly.


Below are three compounding reasons why China will not be able to float a credible navy that can meet the high demands of war at sea.


1) Broken drill bits


I live in China and every time I want to do some home repairs I always buy about 3 or 4 of the same drill bits and about double the amount of screws I will need. Why? Because they break, bend or thread. The quality is poor and rather than buy expensive Japanese drill heads I just buy a fistful of poorly made Chinese ones because it’s easier and over the years my expectations have slowly altered downwards. When I ran a guesthouse in China, we went through three water pumps to keep the water pressure up because they were not only NOT built to last, they weren’t even built to work for more than a few days. This chronic quality control is so pervasive in China that it actually alters one’s expectations to the point of it being absolutely normal. You don’t actually expect things to work, but if they do then it’s a bonus. For the average person growing up in China who has never known anything different, having something that did work, or could work if you change a part is entirely acceptable. The bar is so ridiculously low that the expectation of quality is that so long as no one complains, its ok. Until someone complains, it doesn’t need fixing, mending or altering.


So what has this got to do with a navy?


The essence of naval warfare is impeccable standards and high quality. There’s only one thing that defines a world-class navy and that is high standards. Everything else is secondary to standards. Whether in peacetime or wartime, standards have to be religiously tended to. The measure of a navy’s ability to fight are the standards it keeps during peacetime. In a China where everything is vulnerable to pervasive low standards, is it reasonable to assume that the PLA navy is immune to this old habit. Are we really to believe that an introverted Chinese navy, which has little to no contact with the outside world has been able to escape the low-standards trap that has consumed all of China? My guess is that when push comes to shove the Chinese navy will unravel from the inside out because,

  • of this thing that keeps breaking
  • that thing that hasn’t been maintained
  • those things that no one knows how to work properly
  • this bit that needs a new part
  • that thing that only works when this works
  • and the twisty thing that never really worked at all


One may cite that there are a number of instances where China has exceedingly high standards – the high-speed rail links that will soon crisscross the country being one. But even these projects are dogged by wild rumours of cost cutting and standard shaving. The persistent rumour is that that the lines were built much too quickly at the expense of the standards usually required. It remains to be seen whether this is the case or not, but I will add that these projects have been managed and coached by outside companies which obviously the PLA navy has no experience with.


As China hasn’t floated a modern navy for over one hundred years a salient question would be who are the Chinese navy learning the impeccably high standards and fleet strategies from? The defunct Russian navy? A navy with practically no battle experience that went bankrupt trying to counter a US navy? Who are their mentors?


2. The best new kit money can buy

This seems counter intuitive, surely the navy with the best kit will win. In fact it really isn’t as simple as this. Firstly, it is clear that PLA navy is investing alot in new kit, so one could argue that they are escaping the standards trap in my first argument but this isn’t the case. Lots of new kit comes with its own problems that only compound the standards trap. To demonstrate the problem, please consider two other analogies.


I was once traveling in China and we arrived at a very plush hotel. Everything was immaculate and stunning. When we walked into the bathroom I was surprised to see that we had one of those space-aged looking shower capsules with a thousand different hose settings and wash cycles. Feeling grubby, I eagerly stripped off and jumped into the capsule. After fiddling with the settings the contraption began to whir and whine and after about two minutes a feeble trickle of water started to pathetically spew out of a few hoses, unfortunately not enough water to wash with. Having reasoned that the capsule must be broken I contacted the house keeping. To my surprise, their matter-of-fact reaction was that there wasn’t enough water pressure to work the jets. Thinking it must be something to do with my room I asked to move to a room that did have water pressure. Which of course was impossible, they informed me that all the rooms had space-aged shower capsules but no rooms had the water pressure to use them. The amazing thing about the story is that for the hotel staff this wasn’t a problem. They couldn’t make the mental leap that having the shower capsules but not having the water pressure to use them was pointless. In their minds the two things were entirely separate and expecting both of them at the same time was asking too much. The shower capsules meant that the hotel could describe itself as luxurious, whether they worked or not was irrelevant. Another shower story that will help to illustrate the point was when I was building my guesthouse in China we designed four expensive power-showers. Once they were complete the builders proudly demonstrated a shower working for me and looked pleased with the powerful torrent of water that gushed out. Immediately I ran into the other three rooms and switched on the other showers full blast. Lo and behold the water pressure dropped to the point that each shower just dribbled out water. The builders quickly pointed out the error of my ways. The water pressure dropped because I had all four running at the same time. Once they switched off the other showers they beamed at me with confidence. They just couldn’t get the point that all four showers needed to work simultaneously for it to be considered a success.

Again, so what as this got to do with the navy?

Well the problem is connectivity. Connecting high quality to low quality equals low quality. In both examples the high-end showers were being served by low end pumps and not only did this effect the service provided, the problem couldn’t even be seen by the workers who’s expectations were so low to begin with. So, in regards to the navy, it is my guess that there will be a pervasive connectivity problem where high-end weapons are linked up to low-end products some where in the chain, that will ultimately lead to them being inoperable in significant numbers. So, in reality, a ship may well be able to get one or two sophisticated weapons off either in a highly calibrated exercise or at the beginning of hostilities, but will it have the reliability and connectivity to fire off multiple systems at multiple targets over consecutive days, weeks or months at sea? I sincerely doubt it.

Is it too far a leap to go from power-showers to naval warships? Some might think so, but I disagree. I personally think that if it were ever possible to independently audit the PLA, which of cause it could never be, one would find that the rot of standards and bad connectivity are be even worse than on civi-street.

3) The Thrifty Gene

There’s nothing wrong with being thrifty, it saves on resources and expenses, which can’t be a bad thing, right? However, anyone who has lived in China a long time will note that the Chinese as a race seem very prone to being thrifty. One could cite a whole host of reasons why this maybe the case but it’s not too outlandish to state that over the years natural selection has favoured those with thrifty tendencies. This “thrifty gene” pervades all levels of society and it is my belief that it is directly responsible for an array of product disasters that have far reaching consequences. In his book Badly Made in China, Midler lists out countless horror stories of manufacturers adulterating products to increase their bottom line. However, I think it is too superficial to conclude that this is only motivated by a desire to realize more profit. It is much more benign than out-right vindictiveness and is directly related to the thrifty gene. For the average Chinese boss, the thought of throwing something away because it is only slightly wrong pulls so hard on their thrifty gene that it is almost impossible to do. To discard something that is almost perfect makes no sense, just supply it to a market that doesn’t require such high standards and move on. The thrifty gene is directly responsible for the bad practice of substituting one expensive product with another lower grade product. Don’t get me wrong here, a primary reason is to maximize cost, but this bad habit is made much easier by the thrifty genes compulsion to skim a little here and take a little there. Why use a hundred when fifty works just as well? Add this compulsion to the low standards trap and the thrifty gene has a proven track record of creating products that fail right when they really need to work. A classic example is the case of the faulty naval shells in the 1895 war with Japan. The ruling aristocracy was quick to blame Li Hung Chang’s family for their unscrupulous provision of shells that had been partially filled with sand, rather than the obvious gunpowder, but this is a much too superficial conclusion and ignores the real cause. The thrifty gene. Prior to the war, no one could see the consequences of substituting a bit of sand to off set the cost of the expensive gunpowder. Anyone who believes that in the 21st century Chinese companies would now never supply sub-standard products to their nations military only need to look at the Sanlu, melamine milk scandal of 2008 to realize that this habit is still alive and kicking in modern day China. If the nations’ biggest milk company, aided by the Communist party, would actively and knowingly supply the nations’ babies with poisoned milk is it really believable that the thrifty gene isn’t chipping away at all levels of the military supply chain as well?

On top of this, the thrifty gene has another dangerous tendency, the habit of saving the best equipment until it is absolutely necessary with any wear and tear on it prior to it really being needed frowned upon. This is the mindset that rationalizes that the best china tea-set should only be used for special occasions but what happens is the tea-set becomes so revered that no occasion is ever worthy of getting it out. So it NEVER gets used. To some extent we’re all guilty of this mind of conserving what’s deemed the ‘best’ and not wasting it on the mundane, but in China this attitude can be taken to the extreme. I believe this bad habit is endemic in the armed forces, with senior officers, compelled by their thrifty gene, to hold back from using their best kit as they will not want to waste it on something small and save it for the ‘bigger fight.’ So just like the proverbial tea-set the best equipment will go unused when in actuality it would be better to be using it everyday to its maximum potential. If you think I’m making wild assumptions then maybe you should go a read some Chinese war history and you will clearly see that keeping the best troops in reserve is an habitual habit of Chinese generals.

Why des this matter to the navy?

Because in a naval skirmish, the best go in first, and are often lost to win the greater war. Take the example of HMS Hood against the Bismark, the talismen of the Royal Navy obliterated in a blink of an eye. I remain unconvinced that a PLA ship captain has both the training and worldview similar to the captain of HMS Hood.

To conclude, the combined problem of low standards and bad connectivity are exacerbated by the thrifty gene which all act to compound one another. Admittedly, these factors are all subjective opinions that can’t be proven by hard evidence, but anyone who has spent anytime in China will witness these three factors on a daily basis interacting with each other and creating all kinds of comical and sometimes fatal outcomes. So, is it really sensible to believe that the Chinese military, the most conservative and insular organization in China has somehow risen above them?

I doubt it and only time will tell.

Tuesday, June 28, 2011

Troubled Waters - China’s EEZ, the United States and UNCLOS

Limiting practices in China’s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ)

The 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) created the exclusive economic zone (EEZ) in waters previously regarded as high seas. The aim of the convention was to accord new rights to coastal states to manage resources found in their adjacent seas, extending outwards to a maximum of 200 nautical miles, whilst maintaining freedom of navigation and movement for other states. “Roughly 36 percent of the world’s oceans lie within 200 nautical miles of a coastline, and currently the vast majority of international trade flows as a matter of right on and over the EEZs of coastal states”.[1]

The creation of the UNCLOS agreement seemed to be particularly aimed at developing countries, whose seas may be the source of great resource wealth yet do not have the maritime power to protect them from exploitation by larger, established powers. However, the apparent ‘nobility’ of the convention to allocate the wealth of the seas accordingly has somewhat backfired as the convention is now cited by conflicting sides to either curb or expand maritime sovereignty into the EEZ.

China has slowly risen to the heart of this contention and its views on its EEZ have gradually hardened as its ability to enforce them has increased. Historically, there are many comments on how the established maritime powers saw UNCLOS during its creation period. “President Ronald Reagan made this point clearly when he established the US EEZ in 1983 and confirmed that in the zone, all states would continue to enjoy high seas freedoms of navigation and overflight”,[2]

Obviously, as the predominant naval power of the time, the US had the ability to impose whatever restrictions it wished upon its newly designated EEZs, some of the largest in the world, and in doing so, set the tone for other countries. What emerged after the initial signing of UNCLOS was that freedom of the seas would be maintained, whilst exploitation of the sea’s resources would be controlled by the coastal state. This practice was highlighted in a number of contentious issues throughout the proceeding decades including, European fishing fleets clashing over fish reserves and military reconnaissance flights of NATO and the Soviet Union in each other’s EEZ throughout the Cold War. Writing at the time, one Nigerian scholar expressed the view that,

“the EEZ . . . is a zone sui generis with special rights reserved for the coastal State and the traditional freedoms of the high seas . . . maintained for other States.” The sovereign rights of the coastal state within the EEZ relate only to the natural resources of the sea; the coastal state cannot interfere with the other traditional freedoms of the high seas, in particular the right of navigation and overflight. In other words, special economic rights and jurisdiction over the resources and installations are granted to the coastal state, whilst the traditional freedoms of the high seas, including in particular the right of navigation and overflight, are maintained”.[3]

There have been challenges to the UNCLOS from a number of developing states seeking greater sovereign control of their EEZ, led notably by Brazil. These were eventually rejected, both in practice and law by the major status quo powers and Brazil has now reduced its claims significantly. In response to Brazil’s assertive action in the 1980s to limit military actions or overflight in their EEZ the US responded,

“The Convention recognizes the interest of the coastal State in the resources of the zone and authorizes it to assert jurisdiction over resource-related activities therein. At the same time, all States continue to enjoy in the zone traditional high seas freedoms of navigation and overflight… Military operations, exercises and activities have always been regarded as internationally lawful uses of the sea. The right to conduct such activities will continue to be enjoyed by all States in the exclusive economic zone”.[4]

This remains the current US opinion on EEZs and Brazil’s backing down may not only be attributed to the economic and political clout of the US, but also the willingness of the US military to ensure freedom of navigation across the globe for its military and trade. A precedent was set before UNCLOS came into existence when “Libya unilaterally asserted full sovereignty over the waters of the Gulf of Sidra in the central Mediterranean Sea north of latitude 32°30' north”.[5] Libya was seeking to deny access to any unwelcome ships into the gulf, namely the US Navy. With the signing of UNCLOS, it was agreed that Libya had coastal state rights for the resources in parts of the Gulf of Sidra, but could not restrict freedom of navigation or overflight for civilian or military passage. This unresolved problem finally came to a head in 1986. “During exercises in the Mediterranean Sea involving thirty US naval warships, including three aircraft carriers, the United States sent three vessels into the Gulf of Sidra as a Freedom of Navigation Operation to assert the right of all states to navigate in and above these waters. Libya launched several salvos of surface-to-air missiles against the US naval aircraft operating in the airspace over the gulf, and the United States responded with air-to-surface and surface-to-surface fire, destroying or damaging four Libyan naval vessels and two missile sites”.[6]

It’s noteworthy that the American naval strategy was not immediately confrontational to Libya’s demands in its EEZ, but instead channeled objections via diplomatic means. It took another four years before the US Navy openly challenged Libya’s claim, but one could argue that this eventuality was inevitable. Having seen that the US Navy has both the ability and the will to impose freedom of the seas and will not tolerate any reinterpretation of UNCLOS away from how it interprets it to be, most developing states originally making stringent restrictions for their EEZs have since dropped them. States that still maintain restrictions like North Korea, Iran, Ecuador and Peru have very little ability to enforce them, so the restrictions remain in existence through local unenforceable laws only. Of the states that have signed UNCLOS, 159 states recognize the rights of freedom of navigation and overpass for both military and civilian craft within EEZs. 21 states still maintain some form of extra sovereign control in their EEZs, but it’s China’s viewpoint that remains the most contentious globally.

China and its EEZ

China’s input into this debate has been relatively new. Throughout the signing of UNCLOS, no objections were raised by China, but it has since aimed to galvanize the “re-interpretation movement” of UNCLOS and now vociferously objects to the US consensus of the convention. “China holds the view that a coastal state is entitled to control its EEZ more strictly according to its needs”.[7] For China, the EEZ is more like the territorial sea than the high seas. China’s EEZ claims remain contentious to its neighbours and have yet to be resolved officially, as it also claims exclusive rights on the continental shelf.

This gives rise to the characteristic ‘cow tongue’ or dotted line that can be seen on all maps produced in China, represented in the diagram above as a red dotted line.

Chinese academics and military leaders now seek to afford the EEZ with all the sovereign rights and restrictions of the 12mile territorial zone. Interestingly, Maj. Gen. Peng Guangqian, People’s Liberation Army, described China’s seas, which includes its EEZs as China’s “blue-colored land”.[8] A term not to be found anywhere else in the lexicon of the sea other than China, and represents an attempt to present a major revisionist way to look at the two thirds of the world’s surface. According to Peng,

“China owns five big sea areas from north to south, respectively named the Bo Hai Sea, Yellow Sea, East China Sea, South China Sea, and the Pacific area east of Taiwan”.[9]

This apparent ‘ownership’ of huge swathes of seas, which are intersected by some of the most important sea-lanes of communication (SLOCs) creates an eventual collision course with the US, just like Libya in 1986, and is the heart of China’s modern Anti-Access policy (A2AD). Limiting what is allowed in China’s EEZ has many dimensions, but in particular China’s attempts to limit the actions of the US military. In doing so, China hopes to manipulate the outcomes of its other regional disputes. For instance, if the US military has restricted freedom of movement, this could greatly help in resolutions favorable to China on Taiwan and the South and East China Sea disputes.

At the heart of the argument lies what constitutes ‘peaceful passage’ of military crafts in an EEZ. As stated earlier, the US sees the EEZs as synonymous with the high seas, and as the high seas have been a legitimate place for military crafts to pass, train and reconnoiter for centuries, so it will remain now and into the future. From the US side, all actions of the military are defined as peaceful, unless war is declared, then a coastal state would have a legitimate right to defend its economic interests within its EEZ from its enemy. It has to be stressed however, that even in wartime, EEZs would not become exclusive sovereign territory. The right of free passage would still exist for non-combatants unrelated to the fight, and only enemy combatants and commerce would be engaged by the coastal states. From the US point of view, any coastal state that completely closed its EEZ to peaceful passage would be in violation of the Law of the Seas.[10] EEZs are for resource management only and the coastal state has no right to inhibit passage, either military or civilian. For the US, the name also infers a lot – The Exclusive ECONOMIC Zone, implies that the coastal state maintains an exclusive economic advantage in the zone for the economic exploitation of resources. The economic emphasis is key and there is no mention of other factors, namely military. Compare this to the Territorial Zone, which is heavily weighted with sovereignty. Across the world Territorial Zones and Economic Zones are widely understood. Compare the Territorial Zone of France with the Economic Zone of the European Union. In this case, France has full sovereignty over its territory, but only economic advantage in the European Union. They exist in the same space, but different rights are recognized, especially when it comes to military intervention, or the lack of it. China’s mixing of territorial and economic spheres of influence are seen as major hindrances to future peace from the perception of the US. For the most part, China’s understanding of the EEZ is consistent with international norms.[11] Where China differs is in its definition of peaceful military passage. The Chinese side first argued that no military activity, other than continuous through passage, can be deemed “peaceful” therefore any actions carried out by the US military within 200 nautical miles of China’s coastline prejudices its sovereignty and security. General Peng elaborates,

“When a vessel navigates in the exclusive economic zone of a coastal state, its actions should be “harmless,” undertaken in “good faith” and with “no abuse of rights.” If a military surveillance ship conducts military intelligence-gathering activities in another state’s exclusive economic zone, it is hard to explain this as friendly behavior that is “harmless” and undertaken in “good faith”.[12]

At a conference on confidence-building with the US military, General Peng described how he saw the EEZ, in a very land-based analogy.

“He described a Chinese-style house surrounded by a wall with few windows and a gated entrance. A home owner who sees a man peering in his window suspects him to be a thief and treats him accordingly, but a man who comes to the front gate and requests the home owner to allow him to enter is treated as a friend, welcomed in, and offered tea”.[13]

The story is quaint and certainly touches on traditional Chinese values easily understood by the greater population of China, but it has no relevance in the international law of the sea. Its major premise assumes that the ‘home owner’ owns the area around his house and has even a semblance of sovereignty over it. But ‘land’ analogies like this have no precedent in the thousands of years of sea faring. Even the acclaimed Zheng He relied on freedom of navigation and the sovereign immunity of military ships while sharing the global commons. He wouldn’t have got very far in the Asian littoral if he’d based his sea exploration on this notion of ownership of the seas being akin to ownership of the land.

Throughout the Cold War, neither the USSR or the US sort to restrict each other’s military actions in EEZs. Japan stalked Russia’s subs off its coast, while TU-95 Bears regularly buzzed the UK airspace.[14] Military engagements within EEZ were commonplace and seen as legitimate practices for both sides to practice military maneuvers and collect intelligence on one another. Even at the height of the British Empire, the Royal Navy commanded the seas but never sought to exclusively limit access to other military vessels as long as they were engaged in ‘peaceful’ passage. Even the US Monroe Doctrine did not bar navies from passage. There are many precedents for the free reign of military ships across all the seas of the world in peacetime. Great navies have developed knowing that if every foreign military ship is seen as a hostile, enemy combatant all of the time in all places then normal commerce and stability will quickly derail into paranoia and conflict. A mutual understanding and tolerance of military passage and maneuver is therefore seen as a prerequisite for global trade and more importantly, peace.

Having failed to create a consensus from other UNCLOS signatories on defining military reconnaissance as neither ‘peaceful’ nor legitimate maritime research, China upped the ante and brought in its owns laws, which it has overlaid on its understanding of UNCLOS. “On 19 January 2007, China adopted Temporary Management Measures on Surveying and Mapping Activities Conducted by Foreign Organizations or Individuals in China. Article 3 articulates three principles to be observed by foreign surveying vessels within the Chinese areas: they must comply with the Chinese laws, regulations, and relevant rules; their activities may not involve state secrets of China; and they may not damage China’s national security”.[15]

Bringing in a law that prevents any ship from engaging in activities that may involve state secrets or national security basically shuts the door on any ship, doing anything within the Chinese EEZ without permission, as obviously, terms like ‘state secrets of China,’ are unknowable to outsiders and can be transposed onto anything. Through these laws it is now illegal under Chinese law, for all military ships or planes to engage in any action inside its EEZ, as this can be construed as endangering national security. As UNCLOS states that all ships must respect the laws of the coastal states, the law technically becomes de facto and binding, at least in the eyes of China. Military ships may still argue peaceful passage, but the new laws leave the definition of ‘peaceful’ entirely in the hands of the enforcer. As stated previously, the generally accepted definition of peaceful passage can involve the gathering of military intelligence. This is something that China rejects outright; it can not reconcile any kind of military intelligence gathering as peaceful.[16] This is the fine point that will be critical in determining future relations with China and the US.


What does China stand to gain by limiting its EEZ?

In his piece on the Jurisprudence of Military Surveillance in EEZs, Yu Zhirong gives many reasons why he believes military surveillance should not take place, including, combining military and marine research into one entity, pollution of the marine environment and semantic arguments about the nature of ‘international waters’ in comparison to the rights of EEZs. Whether one finds his arguments valid or not, the underlying unspoken message and principle reason for limiting military activities is because it is part of a broader strategy of A2AD that the PLAN[17] aims to enforce, especially in times of heightened tension.[18]

China’s desire to create A2AD strategy had its birth in the 1996 Taiwan Crisis and has developed incrementally over the years. Not surprisingly, it has been tested by the US on a number of occasions. For example, it is widely accepted that the USS Impeccable incident occurred because it was tracking the passage of Chinese subs coming in and out of the new submarine base on Hainan Island. The PLAN now seeks to limit the US Navy’s reach inside its EEZ by interpreting UNCLOS in a manner that suits their more conservative, secretive approach to seafaring near its coast. With no relevant precedents in place even from the Cold War,[19] the potential for conflict is great as neither the US nor China seems willing to back down from their opposite views. In fact the US Navy’s unwavering commitment to protecting its interpretation of UNCLOS will continue to test China’s resolve. If one considers the latest US official military Strategy for 2011, then there is no question about the American stance on this,

“We will continue to monitor carefully China’s military developments and the implications those developments have on the military balance in the Taiwan Strait. We remain concerned about the extent and strategic intent of China’s military modernization, and its assertiveness in space, cyberspace, in the Yellow Sea, East China Sea, and South China Sea. To safeguard U.S. and partner nation interests, we will be prepared to demonstrate the will and commit the resources needed to oppose any nation’s actions that jeopardize access to and use of the global commons and cyberspace, or that threaten the security of our allies”.[20] (emphasis added by author)

Clearly, we can expect more naval incidents in China’s EEZ, like the ones involving the USS Impeccable, USS Boswitch, USS John McCain, naval drills of the entire 7th fleet in the Yellow Sea or joint exercises like those taking place between Vietnam and the Philippines. It remains to be seen whether the PLAN is prepared to push its convictions upon the US military by any measure in future. History shows us that the US navy’s response may not be immediate, but it will eventually come and will be entirely consistent with the view it has held for the last seventy years – freedom of the seas for its military is paramount and will not be sacrificed.

China’s potential to revise the general consensus on UNCLOS remain marginal at best. If in future China were able to argue a successful case in an international court the repercussion across global EEZs would be catastrophic and global trade would cease to flow as we know it today. Choke points right through Asia, the Gulf of Aden, the Mediterranean, Panama and the Caribbean would foul up, as nation states sought to exercise their new found rights in their EEZs. As China’s national laws deliberately leave vague the idea of ‘national security,’ any ship could technically be stopped and confiscated for any reason in any EEZ. Imagine a world where every coastal state sort to exercise their sovereignty in such vague ways based on local laws? For one, China’s merchant naval fleet and PLAN would have no access to any high seas as they pass through any number of potential adversaries’ EEZ, which could be construed as endangering national security of that coastal state. In reality China knows this, and has no interest in pushing their arguments to final arbitration. Instead, China’s stance is purely for domestic consumption. The easily digestible ‘land’ arguments and the novel phrasing of the “blue land” all play to Chinese nationalistic sentiments as a firmly grounded, land power tentatively expanding out into the sea. So, in the case of any future conflicts with the US, the Chinese people will be able to clearly see the impropriety of the US contravening an international convention. China’s population will be presented a succinct line, where China’s internal laws are consistent with their interpretation of UNCLOS and the US would be in contravention of both, therefore justifying any action both legally and morally to the Chinese people. The Chinese military knows that it can not permanently prevent the US from freedom of navigation within its EEZ, but if the time ever comes to limit it, it will justify its actions from a legal perspective and embed it deeply into UNCLOS and it’s own local laws. Therefore China’s claimed limitations on its EEZ represents the legal arm for military actions and is an integral part of its A2AD policy. It remains to be seen whether China and the US will be able to address their significant disagreements on this issue and continue the relative peace and security that Asia has enjoyed for the last 70 years.



[1] Caelum Liberam: Air Defense Indentification Zones Outside Sovereign. Peter Dutton. US Naval War College. 2010

[2] Caelum Liberam: Air Defense Identification Zones Outside Sovereign. Peter Dutton. US Naval War College. 2010

[3] United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. Possible Implications for International Air Law. Tare C. Brisibe. Michael Milde, 8 ANNALS AIR & SPACE L. 167, 191 (1983).

[4] Note by the Secretariat, UN Doc. A/CONF.62/WS/37 (1983), in 17 THIRD UNITED NATIONS CONFER-

ENCE ON THE LAW OF THE SEA, OFFICIAL RECORDS 240 – 44, UN Sales No. E.84.V.3 (1984).

[5] Yehuda Z. Blum, The Gulf of Sidra Incident, 80 AJIL 668 (1986).

[6] Caelum Liberam: Air Defense Identification Zones Outside Sovereign. Peter Dutton. US Naval War College. 2010

[7] (Xue Guifang (Julia) Issues and Prospects Surveys and Research Activities in the EEZ. US Navy War College 2009

[8] Military Activities in the EEZ. A U.S.-China Dialogue on Security and International Law in the Maritime Commons. Peter Dutton. U.S. Naval War College China Maritime Studies. 2010

[9] Military Activities in the EEZ. Dutton. 2010

[10] Interestingly, the US has not ratified UNCLOS

[11] A norm being that 160 or 88% of signatories of UNCLOS agree with the U.S, with 21 countries having varying disagreements.

[12] Military Activities in the EEZ. A U.S.-China Dialogue on Security and International Law in the Maritime Commons. Peter Dutton. U.S. Naval War College China Maritime Studies. 2010

[13] Military Activities in the EEZ. Dutton. 2010

[14] My bother is an air traffic controller in Scotland and this still goes on regularly today even though the Cold War has long since finished.

[15] Xue Guifang (Julia) Issues and Prospects Surveys and Research Activities in the EEZ. US Navy War College 2009

[16] Strangely, China has very strong views on the term peaceful and how it clearly indicates non-military, yet it describes its own rise as ‘peaceful’ even though it involves a significant military rise in its capabilities. Based on China’s very own definition, if China’s rise truly were peaceful, then it would follow that it could not involve a military build-up. This as we know, is simply not the case as China’s preparation for war is unprecedented in peacetime, and I would say even greater than pre-war Japan’s.

[17] People’s Liberation Army Navy

[18] Yu Zhirong. Jurisprudential Analysis of the U.S. Navy’s Military Surveys in the Exclusive Economic Zones of Coastal Countries. US Navy War College 2009

[19] Yu cites the cases of the shooting down of the R-47 and the U2 over Russia, but these cases only go to prove that in over 50 years of heightened Cold War tensions and the prospect of MAD, how much restraint and understanding existed between the two sides. Both the USSR and NATO regularly patrolled each others EEZs and managed to limit any misunderstandings to just two incidents that were relatively easy to resolve.

[20] The National Military Strategy for the United States of America. Feb 2011


The end of the bubble is nigh


Prior to the 2008 Financial Meltdown there were ample signs that the US economy was heading for calamity, but no one chose to believe it.


Now in 2011 China's economy is showing equal amounts of red flags that its economy is is going to become unhinged in the near future. This is is happening, one can choose to believe it or not.


China’s National Audit Office has completed a review of the scope of local government debt. The report is politicized and conflicts with a similar report released by the People’s Bank of China, but it reveals some of the country’s risky financial practices. It also calls into question Beijing’s ability to manage its debt.


Analysis

China’s National Audit Office (NAO) has completed a long-awaited review of local government debt and submitted it to the National People’s Congress, Xinhua reported June 27. The report claims that total local government debt amounted to 10.72 trillion yuan ($1.7 trillion) by the end of 2010. This sum is close to the 10 trillion yuan estimate leaked in late May. The NAO’s 10.7 trillion yuan total is lower than the 14.4 trillion yuan estimated by the People’s Bank of China (PBOC) earlier in June. (The PBOC claimed its estimate covered only the “local government financing vehicles,” or LGFVs, that were set up to handle investment projects for local governments, which are, with a few exceptions, forbidden by law to run deficits and issue bonds.)

The NAO report is obviously politicized and has been used to argue that the local government debt problem is not as bad as many had assumed — indeed, the report downplays China’s local government debt problem. However, the report provides insight into China’s systemically risky practices, and it calls into question the assumption that China can manage its debt.

The NAO Report

The NAO investigation, launched by Premier Wen Jiabao in March 2011, was a long-anticipated attempt by China’s central government to get a reliable measurement of the full size of the local government debt problem. The office claims to cover a wider range of local government debt than the PBOC, relating to multiple types of agencies and entities in addition to LFGVs (though it did not survey as many LFGVs as the PBOC claimed to have surveyed). The NAO estimated LGFV-specific debt at about 5 trillion yuan — much lower than the PBOC’s estimate. The NAO’s estimate would put total local government debt at 27 percent of GDP, whereas the PBOC’s estimate for LGFVs would put that debt at around 35 percent of GDP.

If the NAO’s estimate for non-LGFV debt (5.7 trillion) is combined with the PBOC’s estimate for LFGV debt (14.4 trillion), then total debt amounts to around 20 trillion yuan, or 50 percent of GDP, for the fullest estimate of total local government debt, according to Victor Shih, an authority on China’s local debt issues. When combined with the central government’s debt — around 20 percent of GDP — the country’s gross public debt would be somewhere in the vicinity of 70 percent of GDP, making its public finances appear much worse than official announcements would indicate. Though this amount would still not reach the highest debt levels seen in some crisis-hit developed countries, it would be higher than China has heretofore allowed. More important, this moment of transparency reveals much that remains opaque in China’s public liabilities — and that debt is rapidly growing in the investment-driven economy.

It is unsurprising that the NAO report differs from the PBOC report and other reports, estimates and leaks. There is a fierce debate taking place in Beijing about the size the debt problem and ways to manage it, with the Ministry of Finance having proposed a 3-4 trillion yuan bailout plan — yet to be adopted — that suggests a large portion of local government debt could turn sour. Notably, the NAO did not provide an estimate for how much of the 10.72 trillion yuan local government debt would go bad. (Previous estimates suggest as much as 20-30 percent could go bad, an estimate conforming to China’s supposed 35 percent bad-debt ratio in the round of state bank bailouts in the 1990s and 2000s.) Nevertheless, the fact that official government reports differ not only on the total amount of debt but also on which organizations are liable and to what extent, suggests serious systemic financial risk.

Moreover, the NAO report gives some insight into the situation beyond the size of the debt, and what it reveals is fairly grim. This is because it reinforces the notion that local governments are rapidly accruing debt. It estimated local debt growth at 62 percent in 2009 and 19 percent in 2010, roughly supporting the PBOC’s previous estimates. It also reinforces the view that LGFVs are borrowing without sufficient collateral, and that they have used borrowed funds to speculate in stocks and property. Moreover, they are using new credit to pay off old debts, with 5 percent of LGFV’s reported to have done so but no specified value of the loans involved. As a result, there is widespread and rapidly building credit risk with ill-defined parameters, confusion as to liability (the NAO report says local governments are only directly liable for 63 percent of the debt, though indirectly for all of it), and the practice of state banks issuing evergreen loans. This practice of rolling over debt endlessly was characteristic of Japan and other Asian financial systems before suffering financial crises in the 1990s. And this is merely the “official” account of the situation; it therefore is likely to hide factors that would be deemed detrimental to the country’s stability if widely disseminated.

The ongoing bailout and bond issuance debate in leadership circles suggests that the local government debt is not felt to have reached a crisis yet. The PBOC claims 50 percent of the debt is not due till 2014-15, whereas the NAO claims 70 percent of the debt is not due until 2014-15. And according to the NAO, some LGFV debt is not being paid on time, but so far only 8 billion yuan is overdue.

Managing the Debt

The net effect of these varied reports is that China is sitting on a massive stock of debt amounting to around 27-50 percent of GDP that was incurred mostly within the past two years. This rapid debt accumulation has proved difficult to control in 2011, with government attempts to restrain bank lending leading companies and banks to evade controls by borrowing through channels outside of banks. The total new credit (total social financing) in 2011 is likely to equal the total in 2010, at roughly 14 trillion yuan. In other words, the build-up is continuing, as is the disguising of the problem.

Chinese authorities appear to be coming closer to authorizing wider local government debt issuance, which they have allowed as part of a trial program in recent years to provide the governments with a more reliable and transparent means of financing their spending. This would alleviate financial pressures on local governments that have led to their operating in gray areas, such as creating financing vehicles and disguising debt. However, such a move would also bring its own threats to central control. Wider allowances for local government bond issuance are likely to come only after wiping off bad debt from their accounts to make their bonds more attractive to investors, along the lines with the rumored Finance Ministry plan. The size of the local government debt suggests a massive bailout plan is in the works, even if it is not implemented immediately. The country’s financial system and economic planners must face these massive debt and bailout challenges — even as a leadership transition is under way.

It has been said that China’s rapid growth makes this debt manageable; this assumption is inaccurate. Though China has maintained an average of 10 percent growth per year for 30 years, this means a correction is coming sooner rather than later. Worrying signs in the export sector point to the fact that the current economic model is expiring. China may be able to delay debt payments, reshuffle among government entities and bail out indebted entities for a period of time, but ultimately the financial burdens on the system will further delay the process of building up household wealth and increasing household consumption. The result will be that rebalancing the economy will be further away than ever and growth rates will fall.

STRATFOR

Troubled Waters

A top U.S. official for East Asian and Pacific affairs says the U.S. government has conveyed to China that its military expansion is raising concerns in the region.

U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Kurt Campbell spoke to reporters in Honolulu, after a meeting with Chinese Vice Foreign Minister Cui Tiankai.

The two officials held their first round of consultations on the Asia-Pacific region in a closed-door meeting Saturday.

Campbell described the discussions as "open, frank and constructive" and said their goal was to obtain a better understanding of each other's intentions, policies, and actions toward the region.

Campbell said the United States reiterated that it welcomes a strong, prosperous, and successful China that plays a greater role in regional and world affairs. However, he also said greater transparency and more dialogue by China about its growing military capabilities would help ease regional concerns.

Campbell said the bilateral talks also included North Korea's nuclear weapons program, maritime security in the South China Sea and Burma.

The two sides say that Saturday's consultations were an outcome of the third round of the China U.S. strategic and economic dialogue held in May and that they reflect a consensus reached by U.S. President Barack Obama and his Chinese counterpart Hu Jintao to build a positive, cooperative and comprehensive relationship

Campbell said that upcoming multilateral sessions should highlight areas where the United States and China -- but other countries, as well -- are able to very clearly articulate areas of cooperation on issues such as disaster preparedness.

On North Korea, he reiterated that the United States is looking for concrete progress in Pyongyang's relations with South Korea. He said the U.S. has urged China again to press North Korea to deal responsibly and appropriately with South Korea, and to refrain from any further provocations.

On South China Sea tensions, he said the United States told China that it wants an end to regional tensions and dialogue among all the key players.

China last week warned the United States to stay out of the regional dispute over the South China Sea waters which are also claimed by the Philippines, Vietnam and Taiwan.

Friday, June 24, 2011

Naval Shadows


Chinese Navy Jiangwei I-Class Missile Frigate 541 Huaibei, front, sails through the high seas between Okinawa and Miyako islands into the East China Sea as Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force Kongo-class Aegis destroyer DDG 176 Chokai, background, monitors its move Wednesday, June 22, 2011.

Thursday, June 23, 2011

Hegemony with Chinese Characteristics

The United States and the People’s Republic of China are locked in a quiet but increasingly intense struggle for power and influence, not only in Asia, but around the world. And in spite of what many earnest and well-intentioned commentators seem to believe, the nascent Sino-American rivalry is not merely the result of misperceptions or mistaken policies; it is driven instead by forces that are deeply rooted in the shifting structure of the international system and in the very different domestic political regimes of the two Pacific powers.

Throughout history, relations between dominant and rising states have been uneasy—and often violent. Established powers tend to regard themselves as the defenders of an international order that they helped to create and from which they continue to benefit; rising powers feel constrained, even cheated, by the status quo and struggle against it to take what they think is rightfully theirs. Indeed, this story line, with its Shakespearean overtones of youth and age, vigor and decline, is among the oldest in recorded history. As far back as the fifth century BC the great Greek historian Thucydides began his study of the Peloponnesian War with the deceptively simple observation that the war’s deepest, truest cause was “the growth of Athenian power and the fear which this caused in Sparta.”

The fact that the U.S.-China relationship is competitive, then, is simply no surprise. But these countries are not just any two great powers: Since the end of the Cold War the United States has been the richest and most powerful nation in the world; China is, by contrast, the state whose capabilities have been growing most rapidly. America is still “number one,” but China is fast gaining ground. The stakes are about as high as they can get, and the potential for conflict particularly fraught.

At least insofar as the dominant powers are concerned, rising states tend to be troublemakers. As a nation’s capabilities grow, its leaders generally define their interests more expansively and seek a greater degree of influence over what is going on around them. This means that those in ascendance typically attempt not only to secure their borders but also to reach out beyond them, taking steps to ensure access to markets, materials and transportation routes; to protect their citizens far from home; to defend their foreign friends and allies; to promulgate their religious or ideological beliefs; and, in general, to have what they consider to be their rightful say in the affairs of their region and of the wider world.

As they begin to assert themselves, ascendant states typically feel impelled to challenge territorial boundaries, international institutions and hierarchies of prestige that were put in place when they were still relatively weak. Like Japan in the late nineteenth century, or Germany at the turn of the twentieth, rising powers want their place in the sun. This, of course, is what brings them into conflict with the established great powers—the so-called status quo states—who are the architects, principal beneficiaries and main defenders of any existing international system.

The resulting clash of interests between the two sides has seldom been resolved peacefully. Recognizing the growing threat to their position, dominant powers (or a coalition of status quo states) have occasionally tried to attack and destroy a competitor before it can grow strong enough to become a threat. Others—hoping to avoid war—have taken the opposite approach: attempting to appease potential challengers, they look for ways to satisfy their demands and ambitions and seek to incorporate them peacefully into the existing international order.

But however sincere, these efforts have almost always ended in failure. Sometimes the reason clearly lies in the demands of the rising state. As was true of Adolf Hitler’s Germany, an aggressor may have ambitions that are so extensive as to be impossible for the status quo powers to satisfy without effectively consigning themselves to servitude or committing national suicide. Even when the demands being made of them are less onerous, the dominant states are often either reluctant to make concessions, thereby fueling the frustrations and resentments of the rising power, or too eager to do so, feeding its ambitions and triggering a spiral of escalating demands. Successful policies of appeasement are conceivable in theory but in practice have proven devilishly difficult to implement. This is why periods of transition, when a new, ascending power begins to overtake the previously dominant state, have so often been marked by war.

While they are careful not to say so directly, China’s current rulers seem intent on establishing their country as the preponderant power in East Asia, and perhaps in Asia writ large. The goal is to make China the strongest and most influential nation in its neighborhood: a country capable of deterring attacks and threats; resolving disputes over territory and resources according to its preferences; coercing or persuading others to accede to its wishes on issues ranging from trade and investment to alliance and third-party basing arrangements to the treatment of ethnic Chinese populations; and, at least in some cases, affecting the character and composition of their governments. Beijing may not seek conquest or direct physical control over its surroundings, but, despite repeated claims to the contrary, it does seek a form of regional hegemony.

Such ambitions hardly make China unique. Throughout history, there has been a strong correlation between the rapid growth of a state’s wealth and potential power, the geographic scope of its interests, the intensity and variety of the perceived threats to those interests, and the desire to expand military capabilities and exert greater influence in order to defend them. Growth tends to encourage expansion, which leads to insecurity, which feeds the desire for more power. This pattern is well established in the modern age. Looking back over the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, Samuel Huntington finds that,

“Every other major power, Britain and France, Germany and Japan, the United States and the Soviet Union, has engaged in outward expansion, assertion, and imperialism coincidental with or immediately following the years in which it went through rapid industrialization and economic growth”.

As for China, Huntington concludes, “no reason exists to think that the acquisition of economic and military power will not have comparable effects” on its policies.

Of course the past behavior of other states is suggestive, but it is hardly a definitive guide to the future. Just because other powers have acted in certain ways does not necessarily mean that China will do the same. Perhaps, in a world of global markets and nuclear weapons, the fears and ambitions that motivated previous rising powers are no longer as potent. Perhaps China’s leaders have learned from history that overly assertive rising powers typically stir resentment and opposition.

But China is not just any rising power, and its history provides an additional reason for believing that it will seek some form of regional preponderance. It is a nation with a long and proud past as the leading center of East Asian civilization and a more recent and less glorious experience of domination and humiliation at the hands of foreign invaders. As a number of historians have recently pointed out, China is not so much “rising” as it is returning to the position of regional preeminence that it once held and which its leaders and many of its people still regard as natural and appropriate. The desire to reestablish a Sino-centric system would be consistent with what journalist Martin Jacques describes as

“An overwhelming assumption on the part of the Chinese that their natural position lies at the epicentre of East Asia, that their civilization has no equals in the region, and that their rightful position, as bestowed by history, will at some point be restored in the future”.

Conservative scholar Yan Xuetong puts the matter succinctly: the Chinese people are proud of their country’s glorious past and believe its fall from preeminence to be “a historical mistake which they should correct.” If anything, the “century of humiliation” during which China was weak and vulnerable adds urgency to its pursuit of power. For a nation with China’s history, regaining a position of unchallengeable strength is not seen as simply a matter of pride but rather as an essential precondition for continued growth, security and, quite possibly, survival.

Deep-seated patterns of power politics are thus driving the United States and China toward mistrust and competition, if not necessarily toward open conflict. But this is not all there is to the story. In contrast to what some realists claim, ideology matters at least as much as power in determining the course of relations among nations. The fact that America is a liberal democracy while China remains under authoritarian rule is a significant additional impetus for rivalry, an obstacle to stable, cooperative relations, and a source of mutual hostility and mistrust in its own right.

Relations between democracies and nondemocracies are always conducted in what political theorist Michael Doyle describes as an “atmosphere of suspicion,” in part because of “the perception by liberal states that nonliberal states are in a permanent state of aggression against their own people.” Democracies, in short, regard nondemocracies as less than legitimate because they do not enjoy the freely given consent of their own people. In their heart of hearts, most self-governing citizens simply do not believe that all states are created equal or that they are entitled to the same degree of respect regardless of how they are ruled.

Seen in this light, disputes between the United States and China over such issues as censorship and religious freedom are not just superficial irritants that can be dissolved or wished away. They are instead symptomatic of much deeper difficulties. To most Americans, China’s human-rights violations are not only intrinsically wrong, they are also powerful indicators of the morally distasteful nature of the Beijing regime. While the United States may be able to do business with such a government on at least some issues, the possibility of a warm, trusting and stable relationship is remote to say the least.

Democracies also tend to regard nondemocracies as inherently untrustworthy and dangerously prone to external aggression. Because of the secrecy in which their operations are cloaked, the intentions, and often the full extent of the military capabilities of nondemocratic states, are difficult to discern. In recent years, U.S. officials have pressed their Chinese counterparts to be more “transparent” about defense programs, but there is little expectation that these pleas will be answered in any meaningful way. And even if Beijing were to suddenly unleash a flood of facts and figures, American analysts would regard them with profound skepticism, scrutinizing the data for signs of deception and disinformation. And they would be right to do so; the centralized, tightly controlled Chinese government is far better situated to carry off such schemes than its open, divided and leaky American counterpart.

Their capacity for secrecy also makes it easier for nondemocracies to use force without warning. Since 1949, China’s rulers have shown a particular penchant for deception and surprise attacks. (Think of Beijing’s entry into the Korean War in December 1950, or its attack on India in October 1962.) This tendency may have deep roots in Chinese strategic culture extending back to Sun Tzu, but it is also entirely consistent with the character of its current domestic regime. Indeed, for most American analysts, the authoritarian nature of China’s government is a far greater concern than its culture. If China were a democracy, the deep social and cultural foundations of its strategic and political behavior might be little changed, but American military planners would be much less worried that it might someday attempt a lightning strike on U.S. forces and bases in the western Pacific.

Such fears of aggression are heightened by an awareness that anxiety over a lack of legitimacy at home can cause nondemocratic governments to try to deflect popular frustration and discontent toward external enemies. Some Western observers worry, for example, that if China’s economy falters its rulers will try to blame foreigners and even manufacture crises with Taiwan, Japan or the United States in order to rally their people and redirect the population’s anger. Whatever Beijing’s intent, such confrontations could easily spiral out of control. Democratic leaders are hardly immune to the temptation of foreign adventures. However, because the stakes for them are so much lower (being voted out of office rather than being overthrown and imprisoned, or worse), they are less likely to take extreme risks to retain their hold on power.

But the mistrust between Washington and Beijing is not a one-way street—and with good reason. China’s current rulers do not see themselves as they once did, as the leaders of a global revolutionary movement, yet they do believe that they are engaged in an ideological struggle, albeit one in which, until very recently, they have been almost entirely on the defensive. While they regard Washington’s professions of concern for human rights and individual liberties as cynical and opportunistic, China’s leaders do not doubt that the United States is motivated by genuine ideological fervor. As seen from Beijing, Washington is a dangerous, crusading, liberal, quasi-imperialist power that will not rest until it imposes its views and its way of life on the entire planet. Anyone who does not grasp this need only read the speeches of U.S. officials, with their promises to enlarge the sphere of democracy and rid the world of tyranny.

In fact, because ideology inclines the United States to be more suspicious and hostile toward China than it would be for strategic reasons alone, it also tends to reinforce Washington’s willingness to help other democracies that feel threatened by Chinese power, even if this is not what a pure realpolitik calculation of its interests might seem to demand. Thus the persistence—indeed the deepening—of American support for Taiwan during the 1990s cannot be explained without reference to the fact that the island was evolving from an authoritarian bastion of anti-Communism to a liberal democracy. Severing the last U.S. ties to Taipei would remove a major source of friction with China and a potential cause of war. Such a move might even be conceivable if Taiwan still appeared to many Americans as it did in the 1970s, as an oppressive, corrupt dictatorship. But the fact that Taiwan is now seen as a genuine (if flawed) democracy will make it extremely difficult for Washington to ever willingly cut it adrift.

Having watched America topple the Soviet Union through a combination of confrontation and subversion, since the end of the Cold War China’s strategists have feared that Washington intends to do the same to them. This belief colors Beijing’s perceptions of virtually every aspect of U.S. policy toward it, from enthusiasm for economic engagement to efforts to encourage the development of China’s legal system. It also shapes the leadership’s assessments of America’s activities across Asia, which Beijing believes are aimed at encircling it with pro-U.S. democracies, and informs China’s own policies to counter that influence.

As China emerges onto the world stage it is becoming a source of inspiration and material support for embattled authoritarians in the Middle East, Africa and Latin America as well as Asia—antidemocratic holdouts who looked to be headed for the garbage heap of history after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Americans may have long believed that growth requires freedom of choice in the economic realm (which is presumed to lead ineluctably to the expansion of political liberties), but, at least for now, the mainland has successfully blended authoritarian rule with market-driven economics. If it comes to be seen as offering an alternative model for development, China’s continued growth under authoritarian rule could complicate and slow America’s long-standing efforts to promote the spread of liberal political institutions around the world.

Fear that the United States has regime change on the brain is also playing an increasing role in the crafting of China’s policies toward countries in other parts of the world. If the United States can pressure and perhaps depose the current leaders of Venezuela, Zimbabwe and Iran, it may be emboldened in its efforts to do something similar to China. By helping those regimes survive, Beijing wins friends and allies for future struggles, weakens the perception that democracy is on the march and deflects some of America’s prodigious energies away from itself. Washington’s efforts to isolate, coerce and possibly undermine dictatorial “rogue” states (such as Iran and North Korea) have already been complicated, if not defeated, by Beijing’s willingness to engage with them. At the same time, of course, China’s actions also heighten concern in Washington about its motivations and intentions, thereby adding more fuel to the competitive fire.

It may well be that any rising power in Beijing’s geopolitical position would seek substantial influence in its own immediate neighborhood. It may also be true that, in light of its history, and regardless of how it is ruled, China will be especially concerned with asserting itself and being acknowledged by its neighbors as the first among equals. But it is the character of the nation’s domestic political system that will ultimately be decisive in determining precisely how it defines its external objectives and how it goes about pursuing them.

As Ross Terrill of Harvard’s Fairbank Center points out, when we speak of “China’s” intentions or strategy, we are really talking about the aims and plans of today’s top leaders or, as he describes them, “the nine male engineers who make up the Standing Committee of the Politburo of the Chinese Communist Party.” Everything we know of these men suggests that they are motivated above all else by their belief in the necessity of preserving CCP rule. This is, in one sense, a matter of unadulterated self-interest. Today’s leaders and their families enjoy privileges and opportunities that are denied others in Chinese society and which flow directly from their proximity to the sources of political power. The end of the Communist Party’s decades-long reign would have immediate, painful and perhaps even fatal consequences for those at the top of the system. Rising stars who hope one day to occupy these positions and even junior officials with more modest ambitions will presumably make similar calculations. This convergence of personal interests and a sense of shared destiny give the party-state a cohesion that it would otherwise lack. Party members know that if they do not hang together they may very well hang separately—and this knowledge informs their thinking on every issue they face.

But the motivation to continue CCP rule is not rooted solely in self-interest. The leadership is deeply sincere in its belief in the party’s past achievements and future indispensability. It was the CCP, after all, that rescued China from foreign invaders, delivered it from a century of oppression and humiliation, and lifted it back into the ranks of the world’s great powers. In the eyes of its leaders, and some portion of the Chinese people, these accomplishments in themselves give the CCP unique moral authority and legitimize its rule.

Looking forward, party officials believe that they are all that stands between continued stability, prosperity, progress and an unstoppable ascent to greatness on the one hand and a return to chaos and weakness on the other. An analysis of the leaked secret personnel files of the current “fourth generation” of Chinese leaders (with Mao Tse-tung, Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Zemin leading the first three) by Sinologists Andrew Nathan and Bruce Gilley concludes that, on this question, there is no evidence of dissension or doubt. President Hu Jintao, his colleagues and their likely successors are aware of the numerous internal and external challenges they face, but they are confident that they, and they alone, can find the solutions that will be needed to keep their country moving forward and enable it to achieve its destiny. Indeed, they believe that it is precisely the magnitude and complexity of the problems confronting China that makes their continued rule essential.

The party’s desire to retain power shapes every aspect of national policy. When it comes to external affairs, it means that Beijing’s ultimate aim is to “make the world safe for authoritarianism,” or at least for continued one-party rule in China. Over the last several decades this focus on regime security has led, first of all, to an emphasis on preserving the international conditions necessary for continued economic growth. The party’s ability to orchestrate rapid improvements in incomes and personal welfare is its most tangible accomplishment of the past thirty years and the source of its strongest claim to the gratitude and loyalty of the Chinese people. Economic growth, my Princeton colleague Thomas Christensen argues, “provides satisfaction and distraction to the population, and, therefore garners domestic support for the Party (or at least reduces active opposition to the Party).” Growth also generates revenues that the regime can use to “buy off opposition and to channel funds to poorer regions and ethnic minority areas to try to prevent violent uprisings.”

As China has grown richer and stronger, the regime’s pursuit of security has also led it to seek an increasing measure of control over the world outside its borders. This outward push has both offensive and defensive motivations. As the steward of national greatness, the party has the responsibility of returning China to its rightful place at the center of Asia. The visible deference of others will provide evidence of the regime’s success in this regard and will help to reinforce its legitimacy at home. Especially if economic growth should falter, “standing up” to traditional enemies and resolving the Taiwan issue and other disputes on Beijing’s terms are likely to become increasingly important parts of the CCP’s strategy for retaining its hold on power. China’s leaders believe that the stronger their country appears abroad, the stronger their regime will be at home.

Conversely, the appearance of weakness or the widespread perception that the nation has been defeated or humiliated could be extremely dangerous to the party’s prospects for continued rule. Underlying concerns about its legitimacy make the regime more sensitive to slights and setbacks, and even more determined to deter challenges and to avoid defeat, than it might otherwise be. The best insurance against such risks is for China to accumulate an overwhelming preponderance of power in its neighborhood.

Moreover, the CCP’s hypersensitivity to what it sees as “separatism” is a direct result of its belief that it must retain tight central control in all places and at all times. Pleas for greater autonomy from Tibet or Xinjiang are thus seen as deadly threats to national unity and hence to continued Communist Party rule. The regime believes that if it loosens its grip, even a little, the entire country will spring apart. China’s leaders see the need to develop sufficient strength to deter its neighbors from providing aid and comfort to separatist groups and will build the capabilities to intervene directly to stop them, should that become necessary.

Even as it grows stronger and, in certain respects, more self-confident, the CCP continues to dread ideological contamination. Pliant, like-minded states along its borders are far more likely to help Beijing deal with this danger than flourishing liberal democracies with strong ties to the West. The desire to forestall “peaceful evolution” at home gives the regime another compelling reason to want to shape the political development of its neighbors.

To sum up: China’s current rulers do not seek preponderance solely because they are the leaders of a rising great power or simply because they are Chinese. Their desire for dominance and control is in large measure a by-product of the type of political system over which they preside. A strong liberal-democratic China would certainly seek a leading role in its region and perhaps an effective veto over developments that it saw as inimical to its interests. But it would also be less fearful of internal instability, less threatened by the presence of democratic neighbors, and less prone to seek validation at home through the domination and subordination of others.

Though not everyone is convinced, it is likely that a more democratic China would ultimately create a more peaceful, less war-prone environment in Asia. In the view of some realists, domestic reforms will only make Beijing richer, stronger and hence a more potent competitor without deflecting it from its desire to dominate East Asia and settle scores with some of its neighbors. It is undoubtedly true that even if, in the long run, China becomes a stable, peaceful democracy, its passage will prove rocky. The opening of the nation’s political system to dissent and debate is likely to introduce an element of instability into its foreign policy as new voices are heard and aspiring leaders vie for popular support. As one observer, economist David Hale, ruefully points out: “An authoritarian China has been highly predictable. A more open and democratic China could produce new uncertainties about both domestic policy and international relations.”

Nationalism, perhaps in its most virulent and aggressive form, is one factor likely to play a prominent role in shaping the foreign policy of a liberalizing Middle Kingdom. Thanks to the spread of the Internet and the relaxation of restraints on at least some forms of “patriotic” political expression, the current regime already finds itself subject to criticism whenever it takes what some “netizens” regard as an overly accommodating stance toward Japan, Taiwan or the United States. Beijing has sought at times to stir up patriotic sentiment, but, fearful that anger at foreigners could all too easily be turned against the party, the regime has also gone to great lengths to keep popular passions in check. A democratically elected government might be far less inhibited. U.S.-based political scientist Fei-Ling Wang argues that a post-Communist regime would actually be more forceful in asserting its sovereignty over Taiwan, Tibet and the South China Sea. As he explains:

A “democratic” regime in Beijing, free from the debilitating concerns for its own survival but likely driven by popular emotions, could make the rising Chinese power a much more assertive, impatient, belligerent, even aggressive force, at least during the unstable period of fast ascendance to the ranks of a world-class power.

The last proviso is key. Even those who are most confident of the long-term pacifying effects of democratization recognize the possibility of a turbulent transition. In his book China’s Democratic Future, Bruce Gilley acknowledges that democratic revolutions in other countries have often led to bursts of external aggression and he notes that, since the start of the twentieth century, pro-democracy movements in China have also been highly nationalistic. Despite these precedents, Gilley predicts that, after an interval of perhaps a decade, a transformed nation will settle into more stable and cooperative relationships with the United States as well as with its democratic neighbors.

Such an outcome is by no means certain, of course, and would be contingent upon events and interactions that are difficult to anticipate and even harder to control. If initial frictions between a fledgling democracy and its better established counterparts are mishandled, resulting in actual armed conflict, history could spin off in very different and far less promising directions than if they are successfully resolved. Assuming the transition can be navigated without disaster, however, there are good reasons to believe that relations will improve with the passage of time. One Chinese advocate of political reform, Liu Junning, summarizes the prospects well. Whereas a “nationalistic and authoritarian China will be an emerging threat,” a liberal, democratic China will ultimately prove “a constructive partner.”

This expectation is rooted in more than mere wishful thinking. As the values and institutions of liberal democracy become more firmly entrenched, there will begin to be open and politically meaningful debate and real competition over national goals and the allocation of national resources. Aspiring leaders and opinion makers preoccupied with prestige, honor, power and score settling will have to compete with others who emphasize the virtues of international stability, cooperation, reconciliation and the promotion of social welfare. The demands of the military and its industrial allies will be counterbalanced, at least to some degree, by groups who favor spending more on education, health care and the elderly. The assertive, hypernationalist version of China’s history and its grievances will be challenged by accounts that acknowledge the culpability of the Communist regime in repressing minorities and refusing to seek compromise on questions of sovereignty. A leadership obsessed with its own survival and with countering perceived threats from foreign powers will be replaced by a government secure in its legitimacy and with no cause to fear that the world’s democracies are seeking to encircle and overthrow it.

A democratic China would find it easier to get along with Japan, India and South Korea, among others. The trust and mutual respect that eventually grows up between democracies, and the diminished fear that one will use force against another, should increase the odds of attaining negotiated settlements of outstanding disputes over borders, offshore islands and resources. A democratic government in Beijing would also stand a better chance of achieving a mutually acceptable resolution to its sixty-year standoff with Taiwan. In contrast to today’s CCP rulers, a popularly elected mainland regime would have less to gain from keeping this conflict alive, it would be more likely to show respect for the preferences of another democratic government, and it would be more attractive to the Taiwanese people as a partner in some kind of federated arrangement that would satisfy the desires and ease the fears of both sides.

For as long as China continues to be governed as it is today, its growing strength will pose a deepening challenge to American interests. If they want to deter aggression, discourage coercion and preserve a plural, open order, Washington and its friends and allies are going to have to work harder, and to cooperate more closely, in order to maintain a favorable balance of regional power. In the long run, the United States can learn to live with a democratic China as the dominant power in East Asia, much as Great Britain came to accept America as the preponderant power in the Western Hemisphere. Until that day, Washington and Beijing are going to remain locked in an increasingly intense struggle for mastery in Asia.

AARON L. FRIEDBERG